


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
January, 1959
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SPECIAL REPORT



Prime Minister Ibrahim Abboud
leaving the Palace in Khartoum
after taking oath of office.

Special
SUDAN
Issue



Crowds celebrating Sudanese independence in Kitchener Square in Khartoum, January 1, 1956.

This is the SUDAN

THERE IS A STORY, quite possibly apocryphal, that a Hollywood producer some months ago was prevailed upon to read a history of the modern Sudan with a view to developing a movie theme. After scanning a few chapters, he threw the book down. "We could never make a movie of this," he snorted, "nobody would believe it!"

Until a little over a century ago, the term Sudan represented neither a definite people nor a distinct geographical area, much less a nation. The Arabic expression *al-Sudan* means simply "the Blacks" and all of northern Tropical Africa from the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean was known as *Bilad al-Sudan* ("Land of the Blacks"). It was not until Muhammad Ali, the Albanian soldier-of-fortune who became the founder of modern Egypt, began in the early nineteenth century to dream of an Egyptian empire that would extend "to the sources of the Nile" that the term Sudan began to acquire some geographical precision. In 1820, Muhammad Ali sent 4,000 Egyptian troops to conquer and consolidate the various tribal entities and kingdoms of the upper Nile basin. Later, the Khedive

Ismail employed European explorers and administrators—General Charles Gordon, Sir Samuel Baker, and others—to help extend the Sudan's southern boundaries.

Historians are sharply divided on the nature of the Egyptian administration of the Sudan during the next 60 years. The traditional British viewpoint is that the period was one of plunder, misrule, oppression, and exploitation. Other reporters claim that, even given some despotic excesses typical of this era in African history, the accomplishments of the Egyptian administration in establishing order and laying the foundations of a modern state far outweighed its shortcomings. Notable among these is Sir Ronald Wingate, who goes so far as to describe Egyptian policy in the Sudan as "the first attempt of what was indeed a civilized power to penetrate and administer savage Africa." The character of Egyptian rule during this period probably varied with the highly varied character of the officials sent to administer the Sudan and Cairo's ability to control them. One point seems clear: by 1880, the resentment of corruption and exploitation had become sufficiently pervasive

in the northern Sudan to set the stage for the rise of a local prophet bent on creating here the nucleus for a powerful new Muslim community.

Muhammad Ahmad, the son of a Nile boat builder, was not the first Sudanese in the mid-nineteenth century to proclaim himself as al-Mahdi (the Guided One), but he was able to convince where others had failed because his was a compelling personality and he made his move at a most propitious time. Egypt, plagued with growing troubles at home, was about to be occupied by Great Britain. In the resulting uncertainty, the Egyptian military force in the Sudan had been seriously depleted. By the time Britain completed its occupation of Egypt in 1882, the Mahdist revolt had captured the Sudanese imagination and reached full-scale, fanatical proportions. Britain had decided that the Sudan should be abandoned, and General Gordon, formerly employed by the Khedive as Governor General of the Sudan, was sent from Cairo to bring home the Egyptian troops. But the Mahdi's "dervish" zealots—by now armed with 21,000 captured rifles—surrounded Gordon's forces in

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About this Issue . . .

The Sudan this month celebrates its third anniversary as an independent African state. This commemorative issue of *Africa Special Report* is designed to highlight the economic, political, and social problems facing the Sudan—problems which take on more political significance with the accession to power of the new government of General Ibrahim Abboud. To the future well-being of the Sudan's more than 11,000,000 inhabitants, and especially the million-plus of them who have come into the world since independence three years ago, this special issue is dedicated.

The articles for this issue were written by HELEN A. KITCHEN, a writer and research specialist who has spent considerable time in Egypt and other parts of the Near East and North Africa. Mrs. Kitchen was formerly Special Assistant to the State Department's Chief of Research on the Near East, Africa, and South Asia, and has been a newspaperwoman, a *Reader's Digest* editor, assistant editor of *The Middle East Journal* and editor of a book, *The Press in Africa*, (Washington, Ruth Sloan Associates, 1956).



The Government of General Abboud

By HELEN KITCHEN

OF THE TEN MUSLIM Middle Eastern countries governed primarily by civilians in 1950, six are now ruled by army officers and at least two more could not survive without army support. These military leaders are by no means cut from the same cloth, however, and their motivations and personalities cover a wide spectrum. In Egypt and Iraq, nationalist-neutralist revolutions against unpopular regimes ushered new social groups into power and greatly changed foreign and domestic policies. In Iran and Jordan, the army continues to be the mainstay of conservative regimes. In Pakistan, the October 1958 coup of General Ayub Khan expressed the army's view that the small conservative elite which has governed the country since independence must introduce reforms to ward off radical developments. In Lebanon, an army general was drafted by a consensus of the warring internal factions in a desperate effort to keep the country from literally disintegrating politically.

In format, the pre-dawn assumption of power by General Ibrahim Abboud in the Sudan on November 17 was a bloodless version of the Egyptian and Iraqi coups, but in fact it is more comparable to the rise of General Fuad Chehab in Lebanon. The principal difference between the emergence of the a-political General Chehab and the a-political General Abboud—aside from the fact that democratic government was retained in Lebanon and that all representative institutions have been abolished in the Sudan—was that the compromise candidate

was selected in Lebanon by open bargaining, whereas in the Sudan the negotiations went on behind the scenes and without consultation with some of the principals.

By early November, it was clear that the Sudan was in very serious internal trouble, both economically and politically. The country's foreign exchange reserves had fallen dangerously low, much of three years' cotton was still unsold, and the government, especially Prime Minister Khalil, was getting most of the blame. Deep suspicion had always existed in the country between the Muslim North and the pagan and Christian South, but in recent months sharp political cleavages and heightened sectarian tensions had also split the Muslim North, which dominates the country politically. The main political issue was Mr. Khalil's increasingly outspoken pro-Western position, which was at cross-purposes with a growing popular sense of identification with the neutralist Arab nationalist views epitomized by Egypt's President Nasser. (This is not to say that very many Sudanese think seriously these days of union with Egypt: what observers frequently describe as "pro-Egyptian" sentiment is most often an emotional response to the Egyptian view of the world, and the place of Arabs and Africans in it.)

Events seemed to be plummeting toward a show-down which would not only unseat the bickering coalition government but might well have immobilized the country politically for a long time to come and/or invited a radical coup. The independent Khar-

toum daily *al-Ayam* wrote on November 11: "Nobody will be sorry to see the present government go. It has been the worst government the Sudan has ever witnessed. It has given this country instability, misrule, disunity, and economic disaster. . . . But what is the alternative? . . . Some people are in favor of a coalition between Umma and NUP, others support a coalition of PDP, NUP, and Southern Liberals. But none of these will give the Sudan the stability it aspires for. . . ."

Although rumors of coups of every flavor had been coffee-house gossip in the Sudan for months, the first really solid plan for a military solution to the political impasse reportedly arose within the Umma Party. At the outset, this was to have been a one-party coup, designed to keep the government solidly in conservative, pro-Western hands. At some very early point in the preparations, however, there was a realistic assessment of the opposition within the country to such a narrowly-based government. Moreover, could the army—which is spirited by a very local patriotism and is non-political, but certainly affected by allegiances of individual officers and men to the country's two dominant religious sects—be counted on to support singlemindedly a government which ignored the strong vein of Arab unity sentiment in the country and also explicitly excluded the powerful Khatmiya sect?

It was at this point, or so the story goes, that the two most influential

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single individuals in the Sudan—Sayyid Abd-al al-Rahman al-Mahdi, leader of a million and a half Ansar sect members and unofficial sponsor of the Umma Party, and Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani Mahdi, leader of another million and a half Khatmiya brotherhood members and unofficial sponsor of the People's Democratic Party—reached a behind-the-scenes understanding to get Sudanese politics off its careening roller coaster by having General Abboud assume a role very similar to that of General Chebab in Lebanon. Once before, these two traditional rivals had "buried the hatchet" in the interests of a larger cause: in 1956, the Khatmiya-sponsored People's Democratic Party entered into a coalition with the Ansar-dominated Umma (which lasted, though uneasily, until the recent coup) for the purpose of curbing the power of Ismail al-Azhari, who as head of the National Union Party was making a strong bid to take Sudanese politics from under the sway of the religious sects.

An analysis of the triumvirate of army generals who carried out the coup reinforces this thesis of a behind-the-scenes compromise and explains the acquiescent wait-and-see attitude of Khartoum's highly partisan press when the newspapers were permitted to reopen a few days after military rule was established. General Abboud is a member of the Khatmiya sect and, though not active politically, was inclined toward the People's Democratic Party. General Ahmad Abd al-Wahab, Minister of Defense, is a son-in-law of former Prime Minister Khalil, a member of the Ansar brotherhood, and associated, though not actively, with the Umma Party. General Hassan Beshin Nasr, Minister of Prime Ministerial Affairs in the new cabinet, is reportedly sympathetic to the National Unionist Party and the triumvirate's most outspoken advocate of closer relations with Egypt.

Thus, the new military regime appears, in initial intent, to be a moderate government designed to anticipate and ward off radical developments by striking a policy representative of a national consensus. In order to maintain the effectiveness of this preventive medicine, however, the regime cannot stand still. It will first have to move a good distance back toward center from the exposed pro-Western position in which Prime Minister Khalil had put himself. Mr. Khalil had too often for his own good been cast in the role of defending aid agreements with the United States, arms purchases from Britain, and contradicting Egyptian statements and charges. His political opposition had taken up the Cairo chant that he had become another "Nuri al-Said"—a very damning epithet in the Sudan or any other Arab country today. General Abboud and company can be expected to avoid such a label.

The Government of the United

Arab Republic has handled its relations with the new regime with utmost skill. The present Cairo theme seems to be, "If you can't beat 'em, join 'em." General Abboud would almost certainly not have been President Nasser's first choice for Prime Minister of the Sudan. Yet the UAR was the first government to send its congratulations and recognize the new government in Khartoum. By embracing the new regime, President Nasser has made it extremely diffi-

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SUDAN

The following broad outlines of Sudanese foreign policy, as enunciated by Foreign Minister Muhammad Ahmad Maghub at the Accra conference in April 1958, have been endorsed by the new military government of General Ibrahim Abboud:

- "(1) Neutrality with respect to the two Eastern and Western Blocs, and cooperation with either of them if such co-operation is in the interests of the Sudan.
- "(2) Non-alignment with any of the Arab blocs, and endeavors to bring them closer together and reconcile their differences.
- "(3) Co-operation in all fields with independent African nations and encouragement of liberation movements in the dependent territories of the African continent and elsewhere.
- "(4) Avoidance of military pacts except for the defense of the Sudan against overt aggression.
- "(5) Acceptance of foreign economic assistance and loans which do not derogate from the independence and the sovereignty of the Sudan; and refusal of offers of conditional aid or loans which might warrant any foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of the country."

cult, in terms of Sudanese public opinion, for the government to do anything but reach a more friendly arrangement with the UAR. But for other reasons as well, it now seems likely that agreement with the UAR on the Nile Waters and other problems will be more easily attainable. Prime Minister Khalil's coalition found the dispute with Egypt, and the implied threat to Sudanese sovereignty, a most useful political rallying point. General Abboud—with no parliamen-

tary votes to worry about—will not have to be concerned with this day-to-day jockeying for survival.

Since long before Sudanese independence, Egypt has engaged in a steady campaign—with a wide range of pressures and influences—to woo Sudanese opinion. At one time, Egypt felt virtually assured that the Sudanese people would elect to unite with Egypt in one nation. Indeed this was the platform on which Ismail al-Azhari and the National Union Party swept to power in the 1953 elections. But al-Azhari in power was a considerably different person from al-Azhari as a campaigner, and he pushed through a unanimous parliamentary vote in favor of complete independence, which was fervently endorsed by all Sudanese who think about such things.

Since this sweeping defeat, Egypt's aims in the Sudan have undergone a number of changes. Today, President Nasser would still undoubtedly welcome with open arms a Sudan signed, sealed, and delivered as a province of the UAR. But being a realist, his immediate objective appears to be a non-hostile government. The need for a friendly regime in the Sudan was brought home most emphatically in 1956, when during the crisis following the Israeli-British-French invasion of Egypt, it was greatly feared in Cairo that Britain might move back into the Sudan and cut off the Nile waters. Egypt would literally disappear as a viable economic unit if its access to Nile waters were curtailed by any hostile country upstream. Egypt, then, would like to have its southern flank in the hands of a government which, at minimum, is favorable to the concept of Arab unity and neutralist in foreign political and economic policies. Beyond this, of course, the friendlier the better.

In his initial proclamation as leader of the new government, General Abboud said the coup was aimed at putting an end to "anarchy and corruption in all state organs" and "eliminating artificially contrived tensions" between the UAR and the Sudan. He said this state of affairs resulted from bickering among political parties which were "tampering with the Sudan's security." The administrative offices of the Sudan Government have been increasingly handicapped by the political finagling going on at the top. Assuming that Prime Minister Abboud succeeds in getting politics out of the government hierarchy, the Sudan's civil service—probably the best-trained and most efficient in independent Africa—can give him effective support in restoring order out of the administrative chaos. Solving the economic crisis, however, will not be so easy (see "Crisis in the Economy," page 9).

While the military take-over was accomplished without firing a shot or

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THE ARMY

THE SUDANESE ARMY—formerly the Sudan Defense Force—is a well-trained, hard disciplined, spit-and-polish force of some 8,000 officers and men. With the possible exception of Jordan's Arab Legion, no fighting force in the Arab East has a more impressive military tradition and *esprit de corps*. Equipped with only manual arms and light artillery, it is not a force designed for external wars, but there is no doubt of its ability to carry out its primary functions of frontier defense and maintaining internal order.

Until the November 1958 military *coup d'état*, the Sudanese Army had been regarded as a thoroughly non-political military force, though it was recognized that the ties of individual officers to one of the two dominant religious sects could become decisive in a serious national crisis. Since both religious leaders endorsed the 1958 *coup*, there has not yet been a real test of the army's intrinsic unity.

Following a short-lived revolt of troops and non-commissioned officers in the Southern Equatoria Command in 1955 and the near-hostilities with Egypt over a border dispute just before the 1958 elections, a quiet campaign has been underway to strengthen the force and modernize its equipment. Four weeks before the Sudan came under military rule, Britain reportedly dispatched to Khartoum a gift of "considerable quantities" of small arms, field guns, and aircraft, and announced that the Sudan would later purchase more British arms "as its financial situation improves"; however, Sudanese sources say these arms had not been received at the time of the military take-over. The number of planes involved in the transaction was small, and they were all propeller-driven models, designed to assure greater mobility for the security forces in a country where distances are vast and some key land routes inaccessible several months of the year. "We have no need for fancy jets," Prime Minister Khalil told a press conference in London some months ago.

A leading Sudanese official was asked recently how he would evaluate the Sudanese Army in relation to the Egyptian Army—with which a tradi-

tion of rivalry has long existed. He replied solemnly, but with just the hint of a twinkle in his eye, "Well, on a man-to-man basis, I would say that one Sudanese soldier would be worth about 10 Egyptians similarly equipped." This is a sentiment broadly shared in the Sudan, and public pride in the army is undoubtedly an important morale factor within the force.

When Sudanese troops were dispatched to the Halaib area near the Sudan-Egyptian border in February 1958, in the wake of an Egyptian claim to this territory, the troops were in high fettle. According to one officer, "They had been told they were to die if necessary to defend Sudanese soil, and they were eager for an encounter. The problem was to leash them while cooler heads in Khartoum and Cairo settled the matter." One crucial factor behind this strong fighting spirit may well be that the Sudanese Army, which performed brilliantly in the Ethiopian-Eritrean and Libyan campaigns during World War II, has never been on the losing side.

What manner of men are the officers and troops of the Sudanese Army? Officer candidates are selected on a competitive basis from among secondary graduates who present themselves for examination. Although academic schools tend to draw the intellectual elite of the secondary graduates, the army is considered a highly respectable career. Until 1954, all officers were northern Muslims, but in the last few years a few southerners have been accepted. By 1958, there were nine officers from the southern provinces, all second lieutenants.

A cadet enters the Military College in Omdurman and graduates two years later as a second lieutenant. Officer pay and allowances compare most favorably with other professions in the Sudan, and "gripping"—at least, over material matters—is within normal bounds. Like the officers of the Indian Army, senior grade Sudanese officers are often almost prototypes of the Britons with whom they served for so many years. They are stern, aloof disciplinarians—respected but seldom beloved by junior officers or men.

The gap between officers and men in the Sudanese Army is very broad,

because of the vastly different social milieu from which they are drawn. At one time, the rank and file of the Sudanese Defense Force was all-black, for the British conscripted solely from the tribes of the south. In recent years, however, conscription has been abolished, and volunteers are drawn from a much broader cross-section of the country. If a man signs up for the army, it must be for a lifetime career. Most new recruits are illiterate, and one of the first tasks of the army is to provide a basic education. Indeed, the Sudanese Government regards the army as an important channel for mass education.

Gradually, over the years, a military tradition has grown up among certain tribes and in certain geographical areas: army careers, for example, are very popular in Darfur Province in the west, among the Shaygia in the north, among the Beja ("Fuzzy-Wuzzies") in the east, and among the Dinkas in the Nuba Mountains of the south. Until 1955, men served with members of their own tribe in the area from which they were recruited. After that year's brief but bloody mutiny of troops in the Southern Equatoria Command against their northern officers—a revolt which began among the troops of the Latuka Tribe and spread to other tribal groups in the southern army—the government broke up this traditional tribal pattern of organization. All companies now integrate both northerners and southerners from as wide a range of areas and backgrounds as possible.

With the establishment of military rule, the Army was placed under the direction of a 13-man Supreme Council, headed by Chief-of-Staff (and Prime Minister) General Ibrahim Abboud. In addition to General Headquarters in Khartoum, there are six regional Commands. The Sudan Artillery is trained at Atbara, while the Engineer and Signal Corps headquarters and the Military College are at Omdurman. The Ordnance and Medical Corps, as well as the colorful, bagpipe-playing Sudanese Army Band, operate from Khartoum. Most senior staff officers have heretofore had their advanced training in the UK, but plans are now in motion for the establishment of a Staff College in the Sudan. —H.K.

THE NILE WATERS DISPUTE

Issues and Prospects

The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement:

This agreement, based on the principle of respect for established irrigation schemes, was signed by Egypt and by Britain, acting for the Sudan. The Sudan came out on the short end of the stick because it was underpopulated and underdeveloped. During the six months of abundant water from mid-July to December, the Sudan is allowed to irrigate with very few restrictions. In the low period, from January to mid-July, about 98 percent of the natural flow of the Nile is reserved for Egypt. The 1929 pact further stipulates that no dams or other works affecting the flow of the Nile, including any constructed in British-controlled territories of East Africa, can be undertaken without the consent of both Egypt and the Sudan. The Sudan rejects the 1929 Agreement as unjust, claiming that it was entered into without Sudanese consent. Egypt has insisted on the validity of the Agreement.

How Much Water In The Nile?

The Sudan now gets approximately 4 billion cubic meters of water annually from the Nile under the 1929 Agreement; Egypt traditionally has received about 48 billion cubic meters. An estimated additional 32 billion cubic meters of water is wasted when it pours into the Mediterranean each year during the flood, and 13 billion more cubic meters diffuse into the papyrus swamps of the Sudd in the southern Sudan. The aim of the water planners is to store as much water as possible in the autumn flood season for use during the dry season that begins in the spring, and to build up a reserve of water during good years for dry years—in other words, to make every year "average" and permit constant and full use. The dispute between the United Arab Republic and the Sudan rests on three basic points: where is the water to be stored, how is it to be captured, and how is it to be shared.

THE SUDANESE PROPOSAL: A Series Of Small Dams

The most recent Nile Valley Plan of the Sudanese Government, based on a highly technical study of the Nile flow over the past 48 years and made public in September 1958, perfects and coordinates several previous, fundamentally British, schemes. Under the new plan, based on the concept that the Nile basin should be regarded as a hydrological whole, water would be stored for Egypt at various points along the Nile and its tributaries, but these storage dams would also provide water for irrigation and hydroelectric schemes in Uganda, Tanganyika, Ethiopia, and the Sudan. Specifically, the 1958 Sudanese plan envisaged the following projects, catalogued from south to north:

★ *In Uganda:* Dams on the White Nile at Lake Albert, Lake Kioga, and Lake Victoria. (The latter dam has already been built by the British at Owen Falls.)

★ *In Ethiopia:* Dams on the Sobat River and at Lake Tana, on the Blue Nile. A tunnel to connect Lake Tana with the headwaters of the Balas tributary, thus creating a shorter, alternate route for the flow of the Blue Nile to the Sudan and providing an important head for the generation of hydroelectricity.

★ *In the southern Sudan:* A canal at Jonglei, which would by-pass a portion of the White Nile and cut sharply the loss of water in the swamplands of the Sudd. A new irrigation, power, and storage dam at Roseires on the Blue Nile. Development of the Sennar Dam's hydroelectric potentialities. A new dam on the Atbara tributary at Khashm al-Girba for irrigation only. (The Sudanese Government is seeking financial aid from the World Bank to extend the dam at Sennar and help build the Roseires Dam; a Bank technical mission spent part of October and November studying the proposed Blue Nile project.)

★ *In the northern Sudan,* between Khartoum and the Egyptian border: A dam at Sabaloka, another (for power only) at the Fifth Cataract, a third at Merowe, and a fourth at Semma for power and storage.

(Continued on page 7)

THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL: The Aswan High Dam

Egypt prefers to store all the water for Egyptian (and some Sudanese) needs in a giant reservoir above Aswan. The Aswan High Dam would rise to 330 feet from the bed of the Nile and stretch 3 miles long, creating the world's largest man-made lake. Here would be stored some 130 billion cubic meters of water—more than 26 times the capacity of the present Aswan Dam. However, the extreme heat at Aswan would cut total availability by one-seventh through evaporation. Such a high dam could open 1,300,000 additional acres of Egyptian land to cultivation and permit some 700,000 acres of Egyptian land now under basin irrigation to be converted to perennial irrigation. It would also provide hydroelectric power equivalent to about 10 times Egypt's present consumption.

When the storage area for Aswan has been filled, some 400 miles south of Aswan would be inundated, penetrating 150 miles into Sudanese territory. Egypt has long agreed in principal to pay compensation to the 50,000 Sudanese who would be displaced from the town of Wadi Halfa and the surrounding area, but the amount of compensation offered is somewhat less than the Sudan demands.

The October 23, 1958 offer of the Soviet Union to extend a credit amounting to 400 million rubles (\$93 million at the present official rate of exchange) to finance the first stage of the dam is an important psychological victory for President Nasser, but it amounts to only a fraction of the estimated total cost of the dam project. Experts calculate that it will take from 10 to 18 years of steady, uninterrupted construction and \$1.3 billion dollars to complete the total project. However, even the first stage—constructing a large cofferdam and diversionary tunnels to hold back the river while the big dam is constructed—would permit Egypt to store a very considerable amount of water. Assuming that development of irrigation facilities is integrated into this first stage, it would be possible to open up several hundred thousand new acres of Egyptian land upon completion of the cofferdam. The UAR's adamant position on Aswan derives partly from considerations of national prestige, but was intensified by the Suez

(Continued on page 7)

Relative Bargaining Position of Egypt and the Sudan

In general, the United Arab Republic has more to lose by postponing a Nile Agreement than the Sudan, for the pressure of population is far more acute in Egypt than in the Sudan. Particularly since the Soviet offer of funds to begin the Aswan Dam, it can be assumed that the UAR is more anxious than before to reach an agreement with the Sudan and get the project underway. The Sudan could wait, and it has the geographic advantage. On the other hand, the Sudan cannot realistically proceed with the second stage of its Manaqil extension of the Gezira scheme unless it diverts more water, and probably cannot obtain financing for its projected Roseires Dam until a waters agreement is reached with Egypt. Both are priority items in the Sudan's economic development plans.

The Sudan has not objected in principle to the Aswan Dam, assuming an equitable agreement can be reached on water distribution before the project is undertaken. Obviously, the Sudan wants to have a clear understand-

ing first that it is free to take off part of the flood for the Roseires Dam and other works. Each of these automatically cuts down on the amount of water available for the Aswan reservoir. The Sudanese are not unfavorably disposed toward a British proposal to create a Nile Valley Authority comprising all riparian states; however, Egypt has apparently won its point that a basic Nile settlement must first be reached between the UAR and the Sudan. On October 26, for example, Muhammad Ahmad Mahgub, then Foreign Minister, said in Khartoum that the settlement of shares of the Nile flow between Sudan's upstream banks and the Mediterranean is regarded by the Sudanese Government as "entirely a concern of the UAR and the Sudan," and not of others. When a settlement has been reached, then, and only then, might talks with the other Nile countries—Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanganyika, Kenya and Belgian territories—be desirable.

—H. K.

SUDANESE PROPOSAL

(Continued from preceding page)

★ *In Egypt:* A new dam at Aswan, though not as large as the one proposed by Egypt. The United Arab Republic would, in addition, be expected to contribute to the costs of the storage schemes for its benefit up the river.

Sudanese experts envisage that these various conservation schemes—or some compromise proposal based on a larger Aswan Dam—should bring the total amount of water available to Egypt and the Sudan—after upstream countries have supplied their own need—from the present 52 billion cubic meters to something like 81 billion cubic meters after evaporation. This amount would be divided, according to the opening Sudanese proposal, on a $\frac{2}{3}$ - $\frac{1}{3}$ basis, with 54 billion cubic meters going to Egypt and 27 billion cubic meters to the Sudan. In the course of negotiations, the Sudan has reportedly revised its demand downward to 20 billion cubic meters.

EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL

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crisis, which greatly enhanced Egyptian fears of having its vital water supply at the mercy of the upstream states.


Egypt takes a somewhat more conservative view than the Sudan of the net amount of water that can be made available from the Nile. Egyptian experts contend that only about 25 billion cubic meters of the surplus now flowing into the Mediterranean can be captured, and that, allowing for evaporation, the total availability of water for Egypt and the Sudan can be raised to only about 70 billion cubic meters (as compared with the Sudan's figure of 81 billion cubic meters). In the initial bargaining, Egypt sought 62 billion cubic meters, was prepared to allow the Sudan to double its present consumption to 8 billion cubic meters. More recently, Egypt has apparently raised its offer to 13 billion cubic meters, still considerably short of the 27 billion cubic meters originally sought by the Sudan, or even of the 20 billion compromise figure more recently proposed by Sudanese negotiators.

"Few people who have studied the problem of Nile development would advocate the High Dam rather than the flexible and much more imaginative Sudanese proposals. . . . But there must be no thought of teaching Egypt a lesson. The only lesson worth teaching about the Nile is that there could be enough water for every one."

ROBIN HODGKIN, Former Director of the Sudan Institute of Education



UNIFORM EDUCATION: *Key to Unity?*



WITH THE RISE of Sudanese nationalism in the late 1930's, a deep suspicion took root that Britain was dragging its feet in educating the Sudanese and was, moreover, perpetuating the cleavages within the country by allowing Christian missionaries to monopolize education in the three southern provinces. The Condominium government repeatedly issued "White Papers" citing the impressive strides made in the development of education since the reconquest, and carefully documented its claim that shortages of finance and staff were the factors forcing a pace slower than all might desire. But many Sudanese were never really convinced that a plot of sorts didn't exist.

Against this background, it is not surprising that one of the first policy decisions of the newly-independent Sudan was to set in motion an ambitious \$20,000,000 five year school expansion and consolidation program. (This is above and beyond the annual budgetary appropriation for routine educational costs: \$16,000,000 in 1957-58, or 12.5% of the national budget.) That the quarrel with Britain was about pace and not methodology is evidenced by the fact that most of the educational policies of the country remain as British as they were under the Condominium. A number of British teachers are still employed in the school system, particularly at the upper levels, and the demand for them exceeds the supply.

The one highly controversial aspect of the new educational program was the government's decision, announced in April 1957, to take over (without compensation in most cases) all sub-grade village schools, elementary schools, and vernacular teacher training centers operated by British and American Christian missionaries in the three southern provinces. The Roman Catholics, with 274 such schools, were most heavily affected, and have taken a strong public position against the government's action.

The government takes the position that (1) real national unity requires—at the minimum—a *lingua franca*, a common educational standard and syl-

labus, and an educational system in Sudanese hands; and (2) the missions were not doing a very effective or systematic job of educating the southern young and were more concerned with conversions than with literacy. Beyond this, there was undoubtedly growing concern at the strides being made by the missionaries in institutionalizing the local vernacular languages by transliterating them into Latin script.

The practical effect of the new legislation is still limited. Most of the nationalized mission schools have retained the same teaching staffs; in many, the only staff change has been the addition of a northern Sudanese director. The Ministry of Education has given assurances, moreover, that there is no intention to thwart the missions in their work and that "instruction in religion" is available in any creed when requested. Courses in Christianity are still taught by missionaries, but the syllabus is now provided by the government and, in general, the relationship between missionaries and potential converts is considerably more circumscribed than in the past. The spread of Islam to the pagan and Christian south would seem to be a probable long-term side effect of the new educational policy.

Private schools operating in the northern Sudan are not yet affected by the government's unification policy. These include 48 schools operated by the Egyptian Government (7 secondary, 22 intermediate, and 19 elementary, with a total enrollment of 8,618 students); 16 intermediate and secondary *Ahlia* (local community) schools; and several Christian mission schools.

Of an estimated 1,600,000 Sudanese children of school age, some 270,000

or about 16.5% are attending school; however, over a third of these are outside the educational system in supervised but unaccredited sub-grade village schools. (These schools, which give some rudimentary instruction in reading, writing, arithmetic, and—in the north—the Koran, will gradually be upgraded to elementary schools as funds and qualified teachers are available.) The public curriculum begins at the age of 7 and continues for 12 years through elementary, intermediate, and secondary schools. Each of these three levels is a complete unit in itself, however, because it is recognized that only the minority will be able to continue to the next higher level. There is a strong tendency toward rote learning in the elementary schools and a pronounced literary bias at the intermediate level. School Leaving examinations at each of the three levels are formal, centrally-controlled, and very similar to their British counterparts. The Sudan School Certificate for secondary school graduates is jointly issued by the University of Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate and the Sudan Examinations Council.

Students who have completed four years of elementary school are eligible to choose either academic or technical intermediate schools. When British educators first introduced the concept of technical education, there was considerable initial prejudice against the "washa" or workshop school; but this was soon overcome, and the 10 technical intermediate schools now in operation have long waiting lists. Some 2,000 persons also attend night courses at the intermediate level. The graduates of these schools—trained in carpentry, metal work, practical drawing, workshop technology, science, and

(Continued on page 17)

Crisis in the Economy

A ONE-CROP ECONOMY is always a hazardous business. The Sudan, with few natural resources except vast stretches of sun-warmed clay soil admirably suited to the growing of high-quality, long-staple cotton, is vulnerable both to the vagaries of weather and the changeable nature of the world textile market. Cotton accounts for nearly half of the country's total revenue, 80 percent of its exports, and almost all of its foreign exchange earnings. It also provides a livelihood for half of the country's population. In 1956, after a period of ascending prosperity that had lasted since the depression ended in the 1930's, the Sudanese cotton industry hit a downward spiral from which it has not yet succeeded in extricating itself.

The present crisis began as the result of a crucial miscalculation. In the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis, the Gezira Board set the price of Sudanese cotton artificially high on the assumption that Egypt's traditional customers would be seeking alternate sources of cotton, and would be willing to pay well for it. But it turned out not to be a seller's market, after all. The Lancashire textile industry largely ignored the overpriced Sudanese cotton, bought in the United States and Latin America instead, while French buyers continued to purchase from Egypt through the back door. The U. S. Department of Agriculture added to Sudanese troubles by putting considerable quantities of surplus cotton on the world market at low prices. Although the Gezira Board eventually lowered its prices drastically to meet competition, the Sudanese cotton industry has never really caught up on sales or regained the pre-1956 momentum.

Here are some of the hard economic facts confronting General Aboud and his cabinet in this third year of Sudanese independence:

★ By November 1958, 20 percent of the 1957 cotton crop and 45 percent of the poor 1958 crop were still unsold, and there were as yet no advance purchasers for the bumper 1959 crop, which will be harvested between January and April. Moreover, about 100,000 more acres are sown in long-staple cotton this year than in 1957/58.

★ In 1956, the Sudan's reserves of gold and foreign currency stood at \$177,940,000. In 1957, owing to the sharp drop in exports, they shrank to \$111,930,000. By May 1958, despite increasingly stringent import restrictions, they had fallen to \$80,360,000 (including \$37,310,000 used as currency cover and not available for payments abroad.)

★ The Finance Ministry has reported that the Sudan's ordinary budget (excluding development ex-

penditures) for the year ending June 30, 1959, will show a deficit of approximately \$8,200,000—the first deficit since 1932.

★ This financial crisis gained full momentum just at the time the Sudan was launching a \$373,000,000 Development Plan aimed primarily at making nearly a million more acres of desert bloom with cotton. Much of the 1957-62 Plan remains in the blueprint stage, awaiting the outside financial assistance required. Minister of Finance Ibrahim Ahmad told Parliament in July 1958 that implementation of development plans, revised as of 1958, called for raising \$87,000,000 from internal sources, preferably obtaining \$129,000,000 from the World Bank, and rounding out the remaining \$157,000,000 from "overseas sources." The World Bank has loaned \$39,000,000 for transportation improvements but has not finally committed itself to help finance the Roseires Dam, presumably pending a Nile settlement that assures the Sudan the necessary water for the scheme. The only firm commitment on unilateral aid is the \$30,600,000 agreement with the United States, endorsed by the Sudanese Parliament in July 1958.

★ The Soviet Bloc has been standing in the wings since 1955, however, and has made at least four separate offers of trade and assistance. In August 1957, the Soviet Union made a token purchase of 9,000 bales of Sudanese cotton, followed up by an offer to take large quantities of surplus cotton to be paid for by large-scale economic assistance. The Khalil government sidestepped this offer, and also did not act on another Soviet offer in May 1958 to provide part of the external financial assistance required for the stalled Development Program. Prime Minister Aboud undoubtedly will have to face new decisions on this score—and each month that cotton stocks remain unsold, it will be more difficult to say "no" to Soviet offers.

Looking beyond the immediate problem of marketing present stocks of cotton, the longer-term economic outlook for the Sudan's cotton-based economy is fraught with uncertainty. Synthetics are increasingly competitive, and the new drip-dry cotton

materials are preferably made with lower grade short-staple cotton rather than the high grade long-staple cotton that is the backbone of the Sudanese economy.

Obviously, the Sudan should diversify, to some extent at least, as a cushion against inevitable bad years in the cotton growing or marketing cycle. But there are not many choices that would produce foreign exchange in anything approximating the amounts derived from cotton. Although the Sudan produces 80 percent of the world's supply of gum arabic, the actual amount of revenue earned is only about \$18,000,000. The prospects for industrialization are not bright. Copper, manganese, and iron were reportedly discovered in 1957, but whether in commercial quantities is not yet certain. The search for oil is in full swing with no results to date. Uncertainty over Nile water allocation and lack of capital have delayed hydroelectric development.

If one accepts the inherent risks of a one-crop economy—and there is no indication that the Sudan is seriously contemplating any other course—the outlook is promising within this limited framework. Good land is abundant, both in the rainfall zone and in irrigable areas farther north. Improvement of the country's highly inadequate transportation system is moving ahead as a result of the 1958 World Bank loan. The government's financial policies are prudent, the administrative standards of the civil servants high, and the population still small enough to permit careful planning.


At least one small break in the gloomy economic picture has been specifically induced by the military coup. On November 27, the United Arab Republic announced that it had relaxed the high duties imposed on certain commodities from the Sudan in 1957. Next to the Sudan's cotton-based trade with Britain, Egypt has traditionally been the second most important purchaser of Sudanese exports. The sharp curtailment in Sudanese sales of camels, melon seeds, cattle, and dates to its northern neighbor since 1957 has been a sore point in UAR-Sudanese relations and a particular economic handicap at a time of slow cotton sales. —H.K.

Politically the Sudan is, I think, the most exciting country we saw in all Africa with the possible exception of Nigeria. This is not a nation half-dead at birth, like Libya. It has the intense virility of something newly-born and its vibrant will to live derives from sound old roots. The Sudan sounds a note unlike any we have met in Africa so far—of animation, confidence, and spontaneity. It is crowded with zeal to get ahead; it boils and sparkles with euphoria.

John Gunther, *Inside Africa*

Sudanese Personalities

AL-SAYYID SIR 'ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-MAHDI, posthumous son of the Mahdi who led the 1881 revolt, is one of the most powerful men in the Sudan, though he has never held a public office. He is the revered leader of 1,500,000 adherents of the mystic Muslim brotherhood Ansar and the sponsor of the Umma



Party. He has an acute business sense which has made him probably the wealthiest single individual in the Sudan. He was one of the first to endorse the new military government in November 1958. After Kitchener defeated the Mahdist forces, 'Abd al-Rahman spent his boyhood as a penniless refugee, but was restored to his inherited religious position by the British during World War I. Later he was knighted by Britain for his successful effort to marshal Sudanese opinion in support of the Allied cause. An impressive personality in any company, he is believed by his followers to have inherited certain qualities of "baraka" (divine grace) not possessed by ordinary mortals. 'Abd al-Rahman has been consistently anti-Egyptian. At one time, he reportedly hoped to become king of an independent Sudan.

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AL-SAYYID SIR 'ALI AL-MIRGHANI, leader of the rival Khatmiya Muslim brotherhood, is also an important behind-the-scenes figure in Sudanese politics, credited with unseating the cabinet of Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari in 1956. Membership in the Khatmiya sect, a mystic brotherhood like the Ansar but with no prophetic overtones, totals about 1,500,000, drawn heavily from urban elements in the north and north-east.

The Mirghani family rallied in support of the Anglo-Egyptian forces during the Mahdist uprising of the 1880's and worked loyally in support of Britain through World War I, when 'Ali al-Mirghani was knighted. In later years, however, he became increasingly bitter toward Britain for elevating the heirs of the Mahdi, who led the revolt, to "power and affluence," allegedly at the expense of the Mirghani loyalists. The Khatmiya leader is the unofficial sponsor of the People's Democratic Party.



Although **MUHAMMAD AHMAD MAGHUB** (Foreign Minister, 1956-58) has now returned to his practice as one of the Sudan's most successful lawyers and personal legal counsel to al-Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, his work in furthering the Sudan's position as a bridge between Africa and the Arab world will have lasting ramifications. He was one of the principal architects of the country's carefully-balanced neutral foreign policy and



Former Prime Minister **ABDULLAH KHALIL**—who stepped down from the premiership in the November 1958 military coup led by his friend and former army colleague, General Abboud—has an unpretentious, easy-going manner which hides a unique capacity for decisive administration, a keen political sense, and a colorful history.

He was graduated from the Military School at Khartoum as an engineer and served for 34 years in his country's military service—first with the Egyptian Army in the Sudan and later in the Sudan Defense Force. He served with British forces in the Dardanelles in World War I, and became the first Sudanese to rise to the rank of Brigadier while commanding Sudanese troops against the Italians during World War II.

Khalil began his active political career only after retiring from the army in 1944, helping to found the Umma Party in 1945. He became Prime Minister in 1956 at the age of 65.

took an active part in both Arab League and intra-African affairs.

Maghub was a major figure at the Accra Conference in April 1958, and the Arab League's candidate for the presidency of the General Assembly in 1958, losing out to Charles Malik of Lebanon. One of his least-known roles is that of principal catalyst in bringing about the intra-Arab agreement at the United Nations which produced the historic Middle East Resolution of August 1958. Born 53 years ago, he has studied both engineering and law, at what is now the University of Khartoum. He was a member of the Umma Party, though a very independent one.



GENERAL IBRAHIM ABOUD— Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese armed forces and strong man of the military junta which took control of the Sudan in November 1958—has spent his entire adult life as a professional soldier. He has a pleasant, gregarious manner, but also a reputation for toughness in a military situation that has made him a respected but not a beloved general. The "New York Times" has described his political philosophy as "likely to be west of neutral and right of center." He has not previously been active politically, but his leanings were reportedly toward the People's Democratic Party.

Born in 1900 in Suakin, a small town on the Red Sea, he studied engineering at the old Gordon Memorial College, was graduated from what is now the Sudanese Military College in Khartoum. During World War II, he served with distinction in the Ethiopian-Eritrean and Libyan campaigns.

In 1948, Abboud became Commander of the Sudanese Camel Corps and subsequently of the Sudan Service Corps; by 1952 he was a Brigadier; in 1954, he was promoted to Major General and named Deputy Commander of the Sudan Army; in 1956, he became a full General and Commander-in-Chief. In 1955, General Abboud headed an arms-purchasing mission in the UK, and in 1957 toured Europe and Asia on a similar quest.

When the United Nations in 1958 selected MEKKI ABBAS as the first Executive Secretary of its newly-established Economic Commission for Africa, the Sudan was deprived of one of its most able public servants. In his new post, however, Mr. Abbas could play a vital role in assuring peace among the countries dependent on the Nile. Born in 1911, Mr.

ISMAIL AL-AZHARI, leader of the National Union Party (NUP) and Prime Minister from 1954 to 1956, was the first leading politician to challenge the hold of the two major religious brotherhoods on Sudanese national politics. Although his government fell on a vote of no-confidence when the Khatmia sect withdrew its traditional support of the NUP, it is quite possible (as the London "Economist" once put it) that "this buoyant person with a latent capacity for wooing workers . . . will resurface." Even without sectarian support, his party won 45 of the 173 seats in Parliament in the 1958 elections.



The son of a religious notable, al-Azhari was born in 1902, educated at Gordon Memorial College and the American University of Beirut, later taught secondary school in Khartoum. He was founder of the Graduates' Congress and later of the Ashiqqa (pro-Egyptian) Party, one of the forerunners of the NUP. Whatever his political future, al-Azhari will always hold a special place in Sudanese history as the man who piloted the Sudan through some very uncertain waters to independence.

Abbas graduated from the old Gordon Memorial College on his twentieth birthday, was a Rhodes Scholar, served for 14 years in the Sudan Ministry of Education, and was active on the pre-independence Local Government Advisory Board and the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan. He formerly edited a social and political news weekly, was one of the official drafters of the now-shelved Sudanese Constitution, and has written an important book, "The Sudan Question" (Oxford University Press, 1952). He was appointed to the Board of Directors of the Gezira Scheme in 1950 and became Managing Director in 1955.



Maintenance of law and order in the Sudan is largely in the hands of MAJOR GENERAL AHMAD ABD AL-WAHAB, who played a key role in the November coup and now serves as Minister of Interior and a member of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

Born in 1915, he graduated from what is now the Sudanese Military College in 1935 at the top of his class and has had an impressive army career. He served as a company commander in the Eritrean campaign during World War II and later was Commanding Officer of the Infantry School. During the 1955 revolt in the southern corps of the Sudan Army, he was in charge of the government's clean-up operations in the southern Sudan. In 1958, at the age of 43, he became Deputy Chief of Staff of the army.

General Wahab has visited the UK in a military capacity three times: to attend a Company Commanders' Course in 1949, to attend a Senior Staff Officers' Course in 1953, and as head of the September 1958 arms purchasing mission.

The only Cabinet officer to survive the change from parliamentary to military rule in the Sudan was Minister of Education and Justice ZI-YADEH 'UTHMAN ARBAB, who retains the same portfolios in the new government. Born in Wad Medani, south of Khartoum, in 1915, Arbab worked as a minor civil servant in the Sudan Defense Force for several years before graduating in 1944 from what is now the University of Khartoum's School of Law.

He has been a successful lawyer, a member of the Umma Party Executive, a winning Parliamentary candidate on the Umma ticket in the 1958 elections, Minister of Social Affairs (1956), and a frequent member of Sudanese parliamentary delegations to international conferences in Europe.

TRADE UNIONS: Communist Stronghold

WHEN TRADE UNIONS were introduced into the Sudan by the British Labour Party government in 1946, the gesture seemed largely a sentimental one. How could a labor movement be taken seriously in a society that still largely revolved around loyalties to tribe or sect, in an economy that was almost entirely agricultural and pastoral, and under a regime so nationalized that 60 per cent of the country's 210,000 non-agricultural wage earners worked for the government?

Yet, in 12 years the Sudan trade union movement has marked steady, uninterrupted gains on behalf of Sudanese workers and has become one of the most effective and sophisticated labor movements in Africa.

★ There are 157 registered trade unions in the Sudan today, encompassing nearly 100,000—or almost half—of the country's non-agricultural working force.

★ Sudanese labor legislation—rules on service contracts, hours of work, payment of wages and overtime, rest periods, deductions from wages, sick

leave, annual holidays with pay, retirement benefits, and compensation for industrial accidents—compares favorably with that existing in Western Europe. Indeed, many of the laws are verbatim copies of comparable British legislation.

★ Owing partly to the many variations in living costs in the several sectors of the Sudanese economy, no minimum wage has been established, but rates of pay are higher than in comparable neighboring economies. The largest, most powerful, and most militant union—the Sudan Railway Workers Union, with 25,000 members—has obtained a wage scale superior to that of railway workers in any other country in Africa, including the Union of South Africa.

Although the strike weapon was used excessively during the early days, largely because of inexperience and a deep reluctance to negotiate with the "alien government" in Khartoum, causing 1,750,000 man days to be lost between 1947 and 1952, fear of negotiation as a means of settling disputes has generally diminished since independence.

"There are various reasons why industrialism causes discontent. When it first impinges upon a people of traditional cultivators and handicraftsmen, it imposes on them a new habit of life, a new discipline—work beginning and stopping with the buzzer instead of according to inclination, the insistent pace of the machine instead of the rhythm of morning and evening, seedtime and harvest. This unnaturally regular work, moreover, has to be done under orders: the worker is no longer his own master, but carries out tasks whose purpose may not be known to him, at the behest of an ultimate authority which he may never see; he feels the ends he is working for are other men's. He looks for support from his fellows, but the old ties of blood and neighborhood have often been severed by his migration to find work. He needs support all the more because wage-earning employment, though generally paying more than the old way of life would yield, is often irregular. It is probably such circumstances as these which have made many . . . wage-earners at one time or another accept some derivative of the Marxian creed. They have known little of its intricacies, but they have understood it to assert that there is a class conflict, and the working class is being exploited; and this has expressed the smart and sting of working life for them more clearly than any other credo. It happens not infrequently that a workman who would never think of voting communist as a citizen choosing a government . . . will do so gladly as a wage-earner choosing a shop steward to stand up for him against the management in his place of work."

—E. H. Phelps Brown, Professor of Labor Economics at the University of London, in his introduction to Saad ed din Fawzi's book, "The Labour Movement in the Sudan, 1946-55".

The Sudanese trade union movement has grown steadily in numbers and in strength, partly because there are no racial splits to plague it, partly because it arrived on the Sudanese scene at a point when workers were sorely squeezed by postwar inflation and highly receptive to any offer of salvation, but chiefly because it was provided with a more sympathetic environment in which to take root than has existed for most young trade union movements in Africa and the Middle East. There have been no restrictions on the minimum size of unions (as in Egypt), no ban against the use of strikes (as in Egypt and Turkey), no enforced arbitration of disputes in essential services (as in Tanganyika). Many African countries do not permit unions to federate. Above all, the condominium set a pattern of respect for union demands, and employers have generally followed suit.

Why Communists?

This considerable freedom accorded a labor movement whose membership is composed largely of persons of very limited educational background and sophistication has also, however, left the way clear for the rise to positions of authority within labor's ranks of a small coterie of highly-skilled Communist tacticians. The Sudan Communist Party, active mainly through front organizations, has made the labor movement its primary target and has managed to maintain a controlling voice in union activities much of the time since 1949.

The Sudan is, moreover, the only country in Africa or the Middle East where the Communists have made real headway in organizing peasants on the pattern established in China. Peasant unions, most of them Communist-dominated, now exist in various parts of the country, but the most striking Communist success has been in the nationalized Gezira scheme—where there are no feudal landowners, where the peasantry enjoys a standard of living far higher than anywhere else in the Nile Valley, and where strikes and other protest actions are directed specifically against the government rather than any "exploiting class." Here the Communists are championing the cause of a new middle class group which has tasted progress and, without quite knowing what it is accepting, finds great appeal in Communist propaganda of better things to come.

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—a man-made miracle

SUDANESE NATIONALISTS are still far too close to the recent past to be able consistently to separate the wheat from the chaff in assessing the effect of British rule. But there is a genuine consensus of pride and gratitude toward the British visionaries who helped the Sudan to transform a million acres of arid flatland into one of the largest and richest single agricultural schemes in the world.

This is the Gezira scheme, which began as a unique partnership of British capital and expertise, the Sudanese Government, and several thousand peasants. Today, entirely in Sudanese hands, its lush fields of long-staple cotton provide more than half of the country's entire revenue. The 29,000 peasants who participate in this economic enterprise and social experiment enjoy the highest standard of living of any peasant group in Africa or Asia. The annual net income of the tenants varies with cotton prices and production, running from \$500 in bad years up to \$2,400 in good years.

It was in 1904 that an American named Leigh Hunt started the first experimental cotton farm in the parched triangle between the Blue and White Niles south of Khartoum. This concession changed hands twice in the next decade, was eventually taken over and further developed by a London corporation, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. By 1913, research and experimentation had demonstrated that some three-fifths of the *gezira* (or island) between the two great tributaries of the Nile was suitable for the cultivation of long-staple cotton. Gradually, the outlines of the Gezira dream began to take shape. In 1925—after long interruptions due to World War I—the Sennar Dam was

completed on the Blue Nile, and the Gezira Scheme was formally underway. The Sennar reservoir, covering 57 square miles, carries water to the farms of the Gezira through 80 sluices, 112 spillways, and 3,000 miles of canals.

For 25 years, the project operated as a tripartite enterprise in which two British concession companies, the Sudanese Government, and the tenants shared the work and the profits, dividing the latter on a 20-40-40 basis. When the companies' concession terminated in 1950, the Sudanese Government, exercising its right of option according to the terms of the concession, decided to nationalize the scheme. Since then, the Gezira project has been administered by a public corporation, the seven-man Sudan Gezira Board.

The Gezira Board maintains the Sennar Dam and canal system; provides free water for cotton, grain, and fodder crops; distributes (at cost) selected and treated cotton seed; arranges for deep-furrow ploughing as needed; processes and markets the cotton; advances loans to farmers; and supervises scientific research stations. For his part, the farmer does the work and bears the expense involved in growing his crop. In order to retain the right to farm his plot, the Gezira peasant must farm and irrigate his land according to a fixed standard and maintain a reasonable level of husbandry.

All grain and fodder crops raised on each tenancy remain the property of the individual farmer, but the profits from the annual cotton crop are split four ways—44 percent to the tenant, 4 percent for tenant social services, 10 percent to the Gezira Board's developmental project and



A Gezira tenant

capital reserve fund, and 42 percent to the government.

The government rents the land within the Scheme from its original owners on a 45-year lease, dividing the whole up into small tenancies of about 40 acres. These owners of land in the Gezira may sell their property, but only to local inhabitants or to the government, never to an absentee landlord.

Peasants who owned land in the Gezira at the outset of the Scheme were given first priority on tenancies; if a man's holding exceeded 40 acres, he was permitted to nominate up to three relatives for three other tenancies. The remaining lots were distributed by the authorities of the Scheme among former workers on the land.

Tenant contracts are renewed annually. All tenant farmers are members of the Gezira Tenants' Union, which is recognized by the Board as spokesman for the tenants.

The Gezira farmer's 40-acre plot is divided into 10-acre units. Each season he plants 10 acres of cotton, 5 of *dura* (millet), 2½ of *lubia* (black eyed peas), and leaves the rest fallow. Cotton is planted in the same field only one year out of every four, which means that only 250,000 of the Gezira's million acres are under cultivation in any one year. Production of *dura* and *lubia* is encouraged so that even in bad cotton years the farmer will be able to feed his family and his livestock. Cotton-picking season, which begins in mid-January, brings in many itinerant workers—some from as far away as Nigeria, Eritrea, and French Equatorial Africa. The Eritreans are usually brought in on contract by the Sudanese Government, while the Nigerians and French Equatorial Africans are often Muslims who stop off on their way to Mecca, to earn money for their pilgrimage.

Although skilled Sudanese technicians and administrators filled the majority of posts in the Gezira Scheme management long before indepen-

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Scene showing canalization in Gezira Scheme



Political Parties Played Active Role Before Coup

Although all political parties in the Sudan have now been dissolved—"the word is dissolved, not suspended," as one Sudanese official emphatically put it—the shadows of old party lines will remain a relevant fact of life for the new regime. Moreover, familiarity with the positions and derivations of the various embattled political parties is a prerequisite for any real understanding of the situation which gave rise to the military coup d'etat. Herewith, then, are some historical facts on the political parties which existed in the Sudan until November 1958:



THE UMMA (PEOPLE'S) PARTY

Founded in 1945. Campaigned for complete independence without any links with Egypt. Associated with Sayyid Abd-al Rahman al-Mahdi and the Ansar sect. Occupied 63 out of 173 seats in the Parliament elected February 1958; senior partner in coalition with People's Democratic Party which governed the Sudan from July 1956 to November 1958. Leaders: Abdullah Khalil (Prime Minister, 1956-58); Ibrahim Ahmad (Minister of Finance, 1956-58); Muhammad Ahmad Maghub (Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1956-58).

NATIONAL UNIONIST PARTY (NUP)

Developed out of the former Ashiqqa Party (founded in 1944) which advocated union of Sudan and Egypt under the Egyptian Crown. Originally associated with the Khatmiya order, but this connection dissolved in 1956. The NUP swept the first Sudanese elections in 1953 on a platform of unity with Egypt, partly due to support from many who opposed union but feared that an Umma victory might mean creation of a Sudanese monarchy headed by Sayyid Abd-al-Rahman al-Mahdi of the Ansar sect. Upon coming to power, the NUP (headed by Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari) reversed itself on relations with Egypt, led the drive for full independence. The 1956 break with the Khatmiya sect came because al-Azhari was becoming too secular-minded in his approach to politics. Upon withdrawal of the Khatmiya element, the NUP government promptly fell. Operating as a purely secular party—the first, outside the Communists, in the Muslim north—the National Unionist Party managed to win 45 seats in the 1958 parliamentary elections. Largely an urban party, its greatest appeal is among civil servants, professional groups, and workers.

THE GEZIRA SCHEME

(Continued from page 13)

dence, the fact remains that the Gezira was basically a legacy from British rule. The 800,000-acre Manaqil extension of the Gezira, now underway, is an entirely Sudanese undertaking, however, and one in which the government takes justifiable pride. The first stage of the Manaqil, partially completed in mid-1958, has already opened up over 130,000 acres of new cotton-growing land, which are being irrigated by a small branch canal of the main Gezira Canal. As anticipated, this branch canal ex-

hausts all the extra water capacity of the Gezira Canal. A new Manaqil canal, designed to irrigate the entire projected 800,000 acreage from the Sennar Dam, is under construction by a German firm as part of the second stage.

The completed Manaqil Extension will have room for 52,000 tenants, supporting a population of over 200,000. Over 100 planned villages are to be built, equipped with elementary schools, deep wells for domestic water supply, sewage systems, village clubs, medical and veterinary dispensaries, orchards, and football fields.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)

Formed in July 1956 by the Khatmiya elements which broke away from the National Unionist Party. After the fall of the al-Azhari government in the same month, the PDP became junior partner in a coalition with the Umma and some 21 Southerners. The decision of the parties sponsored by the rival Ansar and Khatmiya sects to work together in a coalition apparently derived from their mutual desire to thwart Mr. al-Azhari's challenge to the traditional religious base of Sudanese politics. The PDP won 27 parliamentary seats in 1958. Leaders: Ali Abdul Rahman (Minister of Commerce in the Khalil Cabinet) and Mirghani Hamza (Minister of Interior and Hydroelectric Power under Khalil.)

SOUTHERN LIBERALS

There were 38 southern deputies elected in 1958, and between 20 and 25 of these—usually called the Southern Liberals—generally voted with the coalition government. This Southern Liberal group was very loosely-organized and factionalized, however, and it was never a dependable arm of the coalition. Leaders: Father Saturnino Lahore, a Roman Catholic priest; Stanislaus Paysama (the South's candidate for Prime Minister); and Benjamin Lwoki. The remaining southern deputies were uncommitted. On two issues, all southern deputies were firmly united: they favored the creation of a federal state in the south which would enjoy separate and equal status with the north and they wanted an increased share of the country's development program.

Originally, it was hoped that the entire four stages of the Manaqil Scheme and the new canal might be finished by 1962, but the foreign exchange crisis and the delay in reaching an agreement with Egypt on Nile waters distribution have slowed the pace. The estimated total cost of the Manaqil Extension has been revised upward to just over a million dollars, and it has been necessary to defer some of the work planned from the first phase to the second. It is now clear that external assistance will be required at least to finance the third and fourth phases.

—H. K.

THIS IS THE SUDAN

(Continued from page 2)

Khartoum, besieged the city for 315 days, finally broke through and massacred the defenders, spearing General Gordon to death on the palace steps, even as a British-led relief force was approaching Khartoum. The fall of Khartoum led to the surrender of other Egyptian garrisons, and the Mahdist victory seemed to be complete.

The Mahdi died soon thereafter, to be succeeded by Abdallahi, the *Khalifa*. In the ensuing 13 years, the country came very close to committing national suicide. Bloody tribal wars and famine reduced the population from about 9,000,000 to less than 3,000,000. By 1896, the deteriorated internal situation and the approach of Col. Marchand's French expedition from the west impelled Britain to send General H. H. Kitchener and an Anglo-Egyptian camel corps, cavalry force, and fleet of river steamers to recover the Sudan. At Fashoda in 1898, Britain's supremacy in the upper Nile was assured when Kitchener compelled Marchand to evacuate his force.

For the next 56 years, the Sudan was governed and reconstructed by an Anglo-Egyptian condominium. During the first half of this period, Egypt was permitted to play an active, though very junior, role in the administration. By the early 1920's, however, the rise of Egyptian nationalism served to revive pressure from Cairo for "the unity of the Nile valley." In 1924, matters came to a head when Sir Lee Stack, Governor General of the Sudan, was assassinated in Cairo and Egyptian nationalists incited Sudanese troops to mutiny. After a very strong ultimatum to the Egyptian Government from Lord Allenby, the British High Commissioner, the British ordered all Egyptian troops and most Egyptian officials out of the Sudan. From then until after World War II the country was governed virtually as a British colony, although the condominium was never legally dissolved, and after the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, some Egyptian officials and troops were permitted to re-enter the country. The Sudan remained until independence primarily a British show, however, and one on which Britain lavished paternalistic affection and some of the best of its colonial expertise. Although gradual Sudanization was an integral aspect of British rule, there were increasing differences with Egypt as well as with the growing Sudanese nationalist movement over the pace of the country's evolution.

In January 1953, in a move which was more closely related to the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over Suez than to internal events in the Sudan, Britain and Egypt signed an agreement

which provided that the Sudanese would decide their own future after a three year period of supervised self-government. There were many signs that the tide was running in favor of union with Egypt. But by 1955 the popular half-Sudanese General Muhammad Naguib had been removed from leadership of the Egyptian military regime, and the vision of an independent Sudan was becoming attractive for more and more Sudanese. In another of the dramatic moments which dot Sudanese history, Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari, who had campaigned for office on a platform of unity with Egypt, made a maneuver by which the Sudanese Parliament bypassed the projected popular plebiscite and confronted the startled condominium powers with a proclamation of Sudanese independence, to take effect January 1, 1956.

That many experts on the area thought Sudanese independence came prematurely was no reflection on the caliber of Sudanese political and administrative leadership, which rates high among underdeveloped countries. What troubled the experts was that the Sudan lacked almost all of the accepted prerequisites for national unity and democratic government.

In area, the Sudan is the ninth largest country in the world and the largest independent state on the African continent—larger than all the NATO countries of Europe combined. Beyond this, the Sudan had no tradition of religious, cultural, linguistic, or political unity. In a very real sense, it is a country so vast and so varied that it is a microcosm of all of Africa.

Geographically, the Sudan encompasses the sparsely populated Sahara desert of the north and west, where desert nomads wander in search of water for their camels and goats; the fertile lands adjoining the two Niles, where both the country's vital cotton crop and political life flourish; the forests and the vast papyrus swamps of the south; and the mountainous domain of the Beja (Kipling's "Fuzzy Wuzzies") along the Red Sea coast, as well as several other varied regions.

There were 10,262,536 people in the Sudan when the last census was taken in January 1956, and of these some two-thirds are Arabic-speaking Muslims living in the northern and central sectors. They are the products of Sudanese intermarriage with periodic waves of Arab immigrants since 700 A.D. However, south of the 12th parallel, in the region called the Sudd, the Sudan is more literally "the land of the Blacks." Here live some 3,000,000 southern tribesmen in an agglomeration of societies that have maintained their separate identities. Among them, they speak 32 separate languages, composed of roughly 250 dialects. The majority remain pagan,



A young woman from southern Sudan entered in a beauty competition.

though about 200,000 are Anglicans, Roman Catholics, Presbyterians, or Muslims.

The spacious capital city of Khartoum, which was rebuilt by Kitchener after 1898 with the "Union Jack" as a city plan, is—with its much larger suburb Omdurman—the political, cultural, and commercial hub of the Sudan. It is at Khartoum that the abundant Blue Nile meets the sluggish waters of the White Nile to form the majestic single stream which then sweeps into a single giant S as it moves northward to Egypt and the Mediterranean.

Of all the countries of Africa, the Sudan is one of the most difficult about which to make generalizations. It is quite true, for example, to say that for all practical political purposes, the country is a Muslim Arab state; but then, it must also be noted that one of the most influential figures in the recent Sudanese Parliament was a Roman Catholic priest, Father Saturnino Lahore, leader of the powerful Southern Liberal Party. Even sedentary agriculture is still unknown in some parts of the Sudan, yet in urban areas the nation has one of the most sophisticated and effective trade union movements in Africa. Modern airlines now connect most of the major cities, but a network of all-weather roads is still a dream of the future. Only six per cent of the Sudanese population is literate, yet 11 daily newspapers flourish in the capital city of Khartoum. The governing elite of the Sudan is conservative by prevailing standards in the Arab East, yet the professed goal of each government since independence has been "democratic socialism." And while many villages in the Sudan now have a telegraph office, in some cases the lines must be at least 16½ feet above the ground to ensure protection from the giraffes! —H.K.

TRADE UNIONS: Communist Stronghold

(Continued from page 12)

Communist leaders have come to the top of the Sudanese labor movement for some very uncomplicated reasons: they have more skill, more experience, more zeal, and more money than their rivals. The development of a vigorous, uncommitted opposition within labor's ranks has been handicapped by:

(1) the poverty of the unions (dues are notoriously delinquent, and not one union has the resources to pay a full-time official);

(2) the spoon-feeding of the labor movement in the 1940's, which eliminated the kind of struggle in which labor leaders elsewhere learned the hard way;

(3) the elevation of many trade unionist pioneers to management positions;

(4) the lack of contact with more effective trade unions abroad; and

(5) in recent years, the conservative Sudanese governing elite's lack of interest in labor organization.

There has been a tendency since independence to equate a "good" labor movement with a docile one. The problem is further complicated because four-fifths of all organized labor in the Sudan is composed of government employees, and political pressures on non-Communist leaders often tie their hands. (The unions within private industry—mostly of taxi and truck drivers, service employees, and employees of foreign-owned concerns—are small, and often exist on paper only.)

Communist propaganda, moreover, has played skillfully on the government's sensitivity to opposition

charges that it is "pro-western," tempering any official inclination to arrange for the training of non-Communist labor leaders abroad. Since the visit of Vice-President Nixon to the Sudan in 1954, for example, the Communists have harped on the theme that there is an American plot to dominate Africa through trade unions.

Shifts Since 1949

The see-saw for power within the Sudanese labor movement is one of the most dramatic and suspenseful sagas in the annals of trade union history. The story begins in 1949:

The Communists gained control of the executive council of the SWTUF (Sudan Workers' Trade Union Federation) soon after its creation in 1949, but made an uncharacteristic political misjudgment in 1953 which cost them seriously. The SWTUF denounced the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement (pledging Sudanese self-determination in three years) as an imperialist plot to "impede political freedom" and called for a three-day general protest strike. It was not broadly supported by union members, and SWTUF prestige went into a sharp decline. By the end of 1955, the non-Communists had capitalized on the SWTUF miscalculation of Sudanese national feeling and gained a precarious majority in the important Sudan Railway Workers for the first time. In April 1956, a new non-Communist federation—the SGWTUF (Sudan Government Workers Trade Union Federation) was founded.

Unity Move Fails

By June 1956, the non-Communist ranks had swollen to half of organized labor, and the SGWTUF leaders, heady with recent successes, let themselves be inveigled into a poker game which proved to be catastrophic. A "unity conference" of all Sudanese labor was called by mutual agreement of the SWTUF and the SGWTUF, which the non-Communists were convinced would result in the unification of all Sudanese unions under the non-Communist leadership of the SGWTUF. For the first time, the government was actively concerned and prepared to throw its weight solidly behind non-Communist forces in the labor movement. The next step was to have been affiliation with the ICFTU. (Communist encouragement of the unity move was consistent with a new world-wide directive, exhorting local Communist parties to work toward the unification of national labor movements, even where this might reduce the present Communist role in the movement. During the same period, for example, Communists were actively supporting unification of labor movements in Tunisia and French West Africa.)

In the ensuing meeting, the Communist union heads simply fast-talked the non-Communists into weighting the delegations of the various smaller unions in a way that turned out to further only Communist objectives. When the Communist steamroller had finished its job, the executive committee formed to negotiate a unified federation had only 3 non-Communists as against 20 Communists. The SGWTUF quite naturally lost interest in a unified federation.

Since this victory in the summer of 1957, the Communists have further strengthened their position by regaining control (in early 1958) of the powerful Railway Workers' Union, and now reportedly control more than 70 percent of the Sudan's trade union membership. In March 1958, the SGWTUF applied for and was accepted to membership in the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions), but the SWFTU has never joined the Communist WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions). The SWFTU has instead affiliated with the Arab Confederation of Trade Unions, which explicitly excludes applicants who belong to the WFTU, but this has not precluded a close working relationship between the SWFTU and the WFTU. At the WFTU Leipzig Conference in October 1957—attended by an unofficial delegation from the SWTUF—the WFTU executive facilitated this informal relationship with the Sudanese organization by passing a resolution which authorized cooperation with non-member labor organizations having "similar goals."

Attitude of New Regime

In effect, the Communists again hold the key to the operation of the most vital public utility in the Sudan, for a full-scale strike of the employees of the Sudan Railways (which also has all Nile River transportation under its jurisdiction) could virtually paralyze the economy. There are two logical deterrents to a politically-inspired strike called by the Communist leadership, however: (1) the Communist labor leaders learned in 1953 that the trade union movement will not blindly follow its leadership in the use of strikes for political purposes, if these seem to be against Sudanese national interests; and (2) the present strategy of world Communism is to woo, not undermine, newly-independent countries. It seems obvious, however, that the existence of this Damoclean sword is one of the complex factors contributing to the Sudan Government's decision in favor of a cautiously neutral foreign policy. There have been indications that the new military government is girding itself to outlaw the Communist federation on a technical point of non-registration, but this will require either considerable finesse or considerable force.

—H.K.

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UNIFORM EDUCATION: KEY TO UNITY?

(Continued from page 8)

general subjects—fill one of the most vital needs in the Sudan's developing economy, and the government's aim is to establish technical institutes in all provinces. Two technical and three commercial schools at the secondary level have also been created.

Higher-level technical education is available at the well-equipped Khartoum Technical Institution, which has 100 full-time instructors, some 1,800 students last year, and a waiting list of over 2,000. Here, students receive a general education in English, history, geography, Arabic, and religion as well as specialized theoretical and practical training in one of three schools: Engineering, Fine and Applied Art, and Commerce. There is also a Department of Further Education which offers evening and other part-time classes for 1,200 more students.

The country's highest academic educational institution is the University of Khartoum, established as the University College of Khartoum in 1951 and changed to the University of Khartoum in 1956. A fusion of the old Gordon Memorial College and the famed Kitchener Medical School, the University is an autonomous institution financed partly by the government and partly by the proceeds of a £1,000,000 endowment given by the British Government in recognition of the part played in World War II by the Sudanese people. From 1947 to 1956, Gordon College and later the University College had a special arrangement with the University of London by which degrees were issued from that institution, but the newly-constituted University grants its own degrees and diplomas in all faculties. Over 850 students are registered, distributed among seven faculties: Medicine, Arts, Science, Agriculture, Engineering, Veterinary Science, and Law.

Efforts to introduce education for Sudanese girls met strong resistance in the early years of British rule, but the demand now far outpaces the supply of separate facilities and teachers. In 1924, there were only five elementary schools for girls; by 1945, there were nearly 100; and today there are 213 elementary, 22 intermediate, and 4 secondary schools for girls. Girls who have completed their secondary education may attend either the University, one of the two teacher training schools for women, or the three year Nursing College in Khartoum. In rural areas, one of the most important educational triumphs has been the government's schools of midwifery.

All teaching in the Sudan is now theoretically in Arabic at the elementary level, although the lack of qualified teachers has necessitated delays in the universal implementation of

Government of Gen. Abboud

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arresting a single person, this should not be taken to mean that the army will not use suppressive tactics if this becomes necessary. It was General Wahab, now Minister of Defense, who quickly suppressed the brief mutiny which arose in 1955 when north-south tensions in the country sparked an uprising in the army's Southern Equatoria Corps. In the ensuing court-martial, the southern second lieutenant who took command of the mutiny (begun by NCO's) was condemned



Both the Koran and the Bible are used to swear in officials of the Sudanese Government. Here, Sanjino Deng Teng, (left) Minister of Animal Resources in the new Abboud cabinet, takes the oath of office on the Bible. Mr. Deng is a Christian from the Southern Sudan.

to death, another was given seven years' imprisonment, and a third cashiered. In addition, 246 southern civilians were condemned to death in civil courts, although 43 of these were later commuted to life imprisonment. An additional 1,554 persons were tried and sentenced for looting during the mutiny.

Assuming that the army officers corps remains unified behind General Abboud, there seems little doubt that he can maintain power indefinitely. But with the conservative upper crust of the army taking over new civil responsibilities in the Cabinet, middle grade officers will be elevated

this requirement. English is introduced as a subject (for 10 hours per week) at the intermediate level, and is the language of instruction at the secondary and university levels.

The publication of educational texts and the training of teachers are centered at Bakhut-er-Ruda Institute, 70 miles south of Khartoum. There are also two Teacher Training Colleges

to some of the key military jobs, particularly in the provincial commands. The key to any important future changes in the political complexion of the Government of the Sudan would seem to lie with these majors and colonels, who are reportedly neither so conservative, so sectarian-minded, nor so western-oriented as their chiefs at the top.

The role of the religious brotherhoods within the army is also something that we know too little about. Most educated young Sudanese will say that the Sudan is well on the way to modern political life, that the hold of the Mahdis is declining. Yet when the votes in the 1958 elections were counted, the pull of sectarian loyalties proved much stronger than most prognosticators had foreseen. Brotherhood-backed parties won 98 out of the 148 parliamentary seats assigned to northern Muslims. The lesson has not been lost on Sudanese politicians that Ismail al-Azhari fell from power in 1956 because he misjudged the margin by which he could disparage the power of sectarian leaders. But when al-Azhari's National Unionist Party took 45 out of 148 northern seats in the February 1958 elections—with both brotherhoods in opposition—he also proved that the sects can be challenged without political ruin.

The situation seems to be that Sudanese society is in a transitional phase, pulled both toward the secular world of radical Arab nationalism and toward traditional family loyalties. Most of the younger Sudanese openly question the position of the Mahdis, yet few politicians can withstand a direct bid from one of the Grand Old Men when it comes. But these particular Grand Old Men cannot last forever, and it may be more difficult for their heirs to command the same fealty. In the long run, there is little doubt that the intelligentsia—which is increasingly the politically decisive group throughout Asia and Africa, even when it is in the minority—is moving toward a secular view of the world. In this movement, the Sudanese are linked with both Arabs and Africans. For in all of these new and emerging nations, the people are searching for institutions and ideas that will protect their national sovereignty and sustain their society while they fashion themselves into a new nation.

for Women, one at Omdurman and the other in the Nuba Mountains of the south. The 57-year-old Maahad Ilmi at Omdurman, under the direction of the Religious Affairs Department of the Ministry of Justice, has 1,400 students from all parts of the Sudan participating in a 12-year curriculum designed to train ulema and other religious notables. —H.K.

AFRICANS DEBATE TACTICS AT ACCRA

The first All-African People's Conference ended in Accra on December 13, still not having fully resolved the principal issue which dominated the meeting -- should the independence of Africa be achieved exclusively by Ghandian means, or is force justifiable? The Algerians and Egyptians were the principal spokesmen for the thesis that the situation has now reached a point where violent means are fully justified, while Ghana's Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah had broad support for his call in the keynote address for "every form of non-violent action."

This was only one of several issued on which the strong UAR delegation was in disagreement with the Ghanaian representatives, giving rise to new speculation that friction is developing between Nkrumah and UAR President Gamal Abd al-Nasser, both of whom see themselves as potential leaders of an independent Africa. In his speech to the opening session, Mr. Nkrumah warned against new forms of imperialism that may come "in a different guise, not necessarily from Europe." Some observers believed that the Ghana Prime Minister meant Nasser's UAR, though others thought he referred to the Soviet Bloc (not all of which is in Europe) and still others the United States.

Nearly 500 delegates representing 62 trade union, youth, and political organizations in 28 African and non-African countries attended the gathering, sponsored by Nkrumah's Convention People's Party. The conference machinery was controlled by constitutionalist rather than extremist nationalists: Tom Mboya, the urbane and able 28-year old leader of the Kenya Trade Union Federation, was elected president on the first day. Kodjo Botsio, Ghana's Minister of External Affairs and secretary of the Convention People's Party, was chairman of the secretariat. John Tettegah, head of Ghana's Trade Union Congress, and Fred S. McCewan, Secretary General of the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (governing party in Eastern Nigeria) were elected joint secretaries of the conference and the secretariat.

Under this leadership, the meeting steered a moderate course, closing with a compromise resolution which prescribed a non-violent approach but condoned the use of retaliatory violence "to meet the violent means to which some dependent territories are subjected." In other actions, the delegates named April 15 as Africa Freedom Day, to be celebrated each year with demonstrations and mass meetings; established a permanent secretariat; and passed a resolution calling for economic sanctions against South Africa because of its racial policies.

There were some significant signs of the times; no tribal representatives were pre-

sent, and the overwhelming majority of the delegates were in their thirties. The two delegations receiving the loudest ovations were those of Premier Sekou Toure's Democratic Party from Guinea and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). Observer delegates were present from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR, but they played a minor role. This was an African show, and an impressive one.

CAIRO CONFERENCE REVEALS CONTROVERSY

While Africa's political leaders and would-be political leaders met in Accra to plan the end of colonialism, a contingent of African businessmen were concurrently taking part in a 38-nation Afro-Asian Economic Conference in Cairo. A total of 450 delegates -- all officially representing local Chambers of Commerce -- were on hand for the meeting, which ran from December 4 to 8. The conference had been expected by most observers to be a cut-and-dried Communist front production, but many delegates turned out to be businessmen of a decidedly independent turn of mind. Although the original scenario called for decisive action to counter the European Common Market, the actual meeting was largely taken up with pulling-and-hawing over Soviet participation. The only important decision reached was the unanimous agreement to set up a permanent Afro-Asian organization for economic cooperation. Cairo was selected as the temporary home of the organization, but only over bitter protests from Indian delegates.

The most surprising development was a negative one: the Soviet Union failed to reiterate and expand upon the offer it made to the 1957 Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference to provide aid without strings to all Asia and Africa. A Communist suggestion for an Asian-African raw materials pool to keep prices stable did not reach plenary session. However, there was considerable interest in a proposal that the USSR and China supply raw materials to Asian and African countries against payment in local currencies.

POLITICAL DEADLOCK INTENSIFIES IN KENYA

The London *Economist* observed recently that "the curse of Kenya politics is that everyone states his maximum demands and refuses to bargain, or else gets into positions from which extrication is impossible without unthinkable loss of face." Two principals in the struggle for power in Kenya climbed out onto limbs this month from which it will be very difficult to return gracefully:

Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Lennox-Boyd has categorically rejected demands made by the African Elected Members for increased participation in the Legislative Council. In his reply, conveyed through the Governor, the Colonial Secretary observed that the present constitution, introduced in

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November 1957, was intended to be the final increase in communal representation in the Legislature; minor adjustments would be possible, but only after the constitution had been fully tested.

Tom Mboya, leader of the African Elected Members in the Kenya Legislative Council, announced upon his arrival in London en route to the Ghana Conference that the Africans will never cooperate in working with the Lennox-Boyd multi-racial constitution. Mr. Mboya's initial aim is to get the number of African elected members in the Legislative Council increased from 14 to 22.

GHANA-GUINEA MERGER STILL VAGUE

The precise nature of the relationship contemplated between Ghana and Guinea as a result of their announced union on November 23 had still not emerged. One reason is that the decision to federate the two countries was apparently an impulsive one which evolved in the course of Guinea Premier Sekou Toure's visit to Dr. Nkrumah -- perhaps, as the London *Economist* puts it, "the whole idea was born during an expansive evening in Christianborg castle." Even the principals had not worked out the details when they made their announcement.

The picture has been further obscured by the visit to London, Washington, and New York of Guinea's roving Ambassador, Diallo Telli, who has consistently played down the extent of the union. Mr. Telli's purpose is obviously to undermine the French argument that a Guinea united with Ghana does not deserve a seat in the UN if a Syria joined to the United Arab Republic must lose hers. With Guinea's acceptance to full UN membership in December the union may once more become serious business.

In the initial announcement made from Accra in November, it was indicated that the two countries had agreed to adopt a union flag; develop the closest contacts; harmonize defense, foreign, and economic policies; convene a constitutional convention; and set up a six-member economic mission to consider technical aid and currency problems. In addition, Ghana announced its intention to lend \$28,000,000 to Guinea to carry it through the financial crisis occasioned by the precipitous withdrawal of French assistance.

FRANCE'S AFRICAN TERRITORIES CHOOSE AUTONOMY

Most of the French overseas territories which voted on September 28 to stay within the new French Overseas Community have now made their choice among the three alternative relationships with the metropole which the new Constitution for the Fifth French Republic offers. In Africa, Madagascar, French Sudan, Senegal, Gabon, Tchad, Middle Congo, Mauritania, and Ubangi-Chari have all opted for alternative three -- to become autonomous republics within the framework of the French Community. Only four more Africans territo-

ries remain to vote before the February 1959 deadline -- Dahomey, Niger, Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta. France has recognized the right of each of its UN trusteeship territories, Togoland and the Cameroons, to become fully independent in 1960, and the UN has voted to relinquish its trusteeship at that time.

WELENSKY IN LONDON

Sir Roy Welensky flew to London for talks on the controversial new constitutional proposals for Northern Rhodesia shortly after his re-election as Prime Minister of the Federation in November, returned to Salisbury on December 1. While his conversations with the government in London were extensive and friendly, it was clear that there is to be no easy resolution of the differences of opinion. Both Europeans and Africans, for different reasons, have opposed Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd's proposal to add two Africans to the Executive Council of Northern Rhodesia.

KENYATTA TRIAL WITNESS SAYS TESTIMONY FALSE

Jomo Kenyatta will have served three-quarters of his seven year sentence on April 14, 1959, and will thus be eligible for parole, according to Kenya's Minister of Internal Security John Cusack. This announcement followed closely upon the release of a sworn affidavit from one of the principal prosecution witnesses in the trial which convicted Kenyatta of managing Mau Mau, swearing that the evidence given by the witness in the trial was false, and that he gave it because of "considerations" offered him by the Kenya Government before the trial. The Government has asked for a full investigation.

TREASON TRIAL TO BE RESUMED

The South African Government has announced that the mass treason trial will resume on January 19, but with fewer persons in the dock. Thirty of the accused will go on trial in January, while the remaining 61 will be held for separate trial beginning April 20. Both trials will be conducted without jury by three Supreme Court judges.

GHANA PROPOSES ANTI-STRIKE MEASURE

The Government of Ghana has proposed a law to forbid strikes by civil servants and other governmental employees would have to give four weeks notice of a strike. The measure was published December 7, and indications were for speedy enactment.

KARIBA DAM COMPLETED

The Kariba Dam is now completed, and Southern Rhodesia is waiting for seasonal floods on the Zambesi River to begin to fill the largest man-made lake in the world. Experts calculate it will take from three to six years to accumulate the 140,000,000 cubic feet of water required to fill the 2,000 square mile Lake Elizabeth. --H.K.

Sudan Aids Foreign Investment

(Excerpts from an official statement)


"In this country, railways, ordnance works, and certain public utilities are already very largely state-owned and state-operated. This arrangement will naturally continue. Government will give a high priority to the development of the hydroelectric power which is the only means of substantially making good the handicap of absence of coal and oil in the Sudan.

"The government has already indicated on several occasions its intention to encourage private enterprise and to create conditions which attract foreign capital to this country for such enterprises. All applications for government assistance to private enterprise, whether local or foreign, will be referred to a government Advisory Committee, which will make an assessment as to whether each application is worthy of classification as an 'approved' or 'pioneer' enterprise. . . . To qualify as an 'approved' or 'pioneer' enterprise, the business must pass the following tests:

- "(1) It must be beneficial to the public interest (e.g., by increasing the national income, by saving foreign exchange, or for strategic reasons).
- "(2) It must have a favorable prospect of successful development.
- "(3) Its function must not already be adequately performed within the country.
- "(4) Adequate capital and efficient management are available.

"Approved enterprises will be given assistance in one or another or several of the following forms (the list being informative rather than exhaustive):

- Business Profits Tax relief from two to five years.
- Preferential railway tariff rates.
- Assured government orders for a prescribed period.
- Facilities for entry of necessary qualified technicians and other foreign employees.
- Provision of commercial intelligence and advice.



To the People of the U.S.:

DR. IBRAHIM ANIS, whose warm and open manner made many friends for the Sudan during the two years he served as his country's first Ambassador to the United States, issued the following statement before his return to Khartoum for retirement in late November:

"I would like to thank the American public and especially the American press for the thoughtful consideration with which they received and appraised the news of the recent developments in my country. Thanks to your refusal to jump to hasty conclusions and make comparisons with events in other countries which would not apply to the Sudan, the relations between our countries have not been strained as they might have been through misunderstanding and we remain today good friends.

"The Government of my country was changed because partisan strife between political parties threatened to bring about a demoralization of our people and a loss of confidence in our ability as a nation to preserve the principles of freedom and independence to which our people are determined to adhere.

"A government of stability, including both military and civil leaders acting with the approval of the spiritual leaders of our country, has assumed responsibility to the people to resolve our internal problems and to maintain cordial relations with all other countries as befitting a free and independent, democratic Republic. It has assumed the responsibility in a peaceful and orderly manner without impairing the rights of dissident elements or freedom of movement of any of our citizens or visitors to our country. It has assured complete freedom of the press. It has pledged itself to be bound by and give full effect to the agreements into which the Republic of the Sudan has entered since our independence nearly three years ago.

"In doing this my country has not been moved by external pressures or by any feeling of unfriendliness towards other countries. On the contrary, our Prime Minister, El Ferik Ibrahim Pasha Abboud, and his Government will work to improve these relations on the basis of mutual respect, friendship and mutual interest.

"Paramount among the problems of relations with other countries to which our Government will address itself will be to give expression to the conviction of every Sudanese that it is of utmost importance to bring about a fair division of the waters of the Nile which flow from our country into Egypt and which are of great importance to the economic development of both nations.

"Our new Government has now been recognized by virtually every other country, including your own. As my nation's representative in the United States since our independence I have seen the steady growth of closer relations and greater understanding between our countries. I am made confident by the recent events in my country and the sympathetic response to them by your country, that these cordial relations will endure and, indeed, can now be made even more strong.

"It is my pleasure that my diplomatic career began and ended with my service as Ambassador to the United States. It is a happy coincidence that my last day in the United States is Thanksgiving Day. For me it is a day on which I give thanks for all the wonderful friends I have made here. It is a day on which I congratulate all Americans for the friendship they have extended to me and to my country. Although I am returning to private life, I want them all to know I shall never cease my efforts to bring about increasingly close relations between our two nations."

- Protective duties on competitive articles from abroad on the basis of the recommendations of an impartial expert body.
- Permission for foreign employees to remit bonafide savings to their country of origin.

"Foreign industrialists must undertake to provide reasonable facilities for the training of Sudanese personnel and for the progressive participation of such personnel in their establishments.

"The government accepts the principle that foreign industrialists should have the right to remit profits to the country of the origin of the capital and, furthermore, it would give an assurance in respect of the payment of fair and equitable compensation in the event of acquisition of any property for nationalization and will grant facilities for the repatriation of such compensation. It would further give an assurance of non-discrimination between foreign and local enterprise.

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Sudan Aids Foreign Investment

(Excerpts from an official statement)

"In this country, railways, ordnance works, and certain public utilities are already very largely state-owned and state-operated. This arrangement will naturally continue. Government will give a high priority to the development of the hydroelectric power which is the only means of substantially making good the handicap of absence of coal and oil in the Sudan.

"The government has already indicated on several occasions its intention to encourage private enterprise and to create conditions which attract foreign capital to this country for such enterprises. All applications for government assistance to private enterprise, whether local or foreign, will be referred to a government Advisory Committee, which will make an assessment as to whether each application is worthy of classification as an 'approved' or 'pioneer' enterprise. . . . To qualify as an 'approved' or 'pioneer' enterprise, the business must pass the following tests:

- "(1) It must be beneficial to the public interest (e.g., by increasing the national income, by saving foreign exchange, or for strategic reasons).
- "(2) It must have a favorable prospect of successful development.
- "(3) Its function must not already be adequately performed within the country.
- "(4) Adequate capital and efficient management are available.

"Approved enterprises will be given assistance in one or another or several of the following forms (the list being informative rather than exhaustive):

- Business Profits Tax relief from two to five years.
- Preferential railway tariff rates.
- Assured government orders for a prescribed period.
- Facilities for entry of necessary qualified technicians and other foreign employees.
- Provision of commercial intelligence and advice.



To the People of the U.S.:

DR. IBRAHIM ANIS, whose warm and open manner made many friends for the Sudan during the two years he served as his country's first Ambassador to the United States, issued the following statement before his return to Khartoum for retirement in late November:

"I would like to thank the American public and especially the American press for the thoughtful consideration with which they received and appraised the news of the recent developments in my country. Thanks to your refusal to jump to hasty conclusions and make comparisons with events in other countries which would not apply to the Sudan, the relations between our countries have not been strained as they might have been through misunderstanding and we remain today good friends.

"The Government of my country was changed because partisan strife between political parties threatened to bring about a demoralization of our people and a loss of confidence in our ability as a nation to preserve the principles of freedom and independence to which our people are determined to adhere.

"A government of stability, including both military and civil leaders acting with the approval of the spiritual leaders of our country, has assumed responsibility to the people to resolve our internal problems and to maintain cordial relations with all other countries as befitting a free and independent, democratic Republic. It has assumed the responsibility in a peaceful and orderly manner without impairing the rights of dissident elements or freedom of movement of any of our citizens or visitors to our country. It has assured complete freedom of the press. It has pledged itself to be bound by and give full effect to the agreements into which the Republic of the Sudan has entered since our independence nearly three years ago.

"In doing this my country has not been moved by external pressures or by any feeling of unfriendliness towards other countries. On the contrary, our Prime Minister, El Ferik Ibrahim Pasha Abboud, and his Government will work to improve these relations on the basis of mutual respect, friendship and mutual interest.

"Paramount among the problems of relations with other countries to which our Government will address itself will be to give expression to the conviction of every Sudanese that it is of utmost importance to bring about a fair division of the waters of the Nile which flow from our country into Egypt and which are of great importance to the economic development of both nations.

"Our new Government has now been recognized by virtually every other country, including your own. As my nation's representative in the United States since our independence I have seen the steady growth of closer relations and greater understanding between our countries. I am made confident by the recent events in my country and the sympathetic response to them by your country, that these cordial relations will endure and, indeed, can now be made even more strong.

"It is my pleasure that my diplomatic career began and ended with my service as Ambassador to the United States. It is a happy coincidence that my last day in the United States is Thanksgiving Day. For me it is a day on which I give thanks for all the wonderful friends I have made here. It is a day on which I congratulate all Americans for the friendship they have extended to me and to my country. Although I am returning to private life, I want them all to know I shall never cease my efforts to bring about increasingly close relations between our two nations."

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